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Perhaps it is a line that stretches horizontally in front of you, with the past 
all gathered up to your left, the future to your right, and the place where you 
stand marking the present. Perhaps the line stretches front to back, with the 
past behind you and the future in front. Or perhaps the other way around, 
as it is for the Aymara people from the Andes (Nuñez and Sweetser 2006). 
Maybe the line is actually a river, and from the riverbank you can view time 
and the events happening within it, with the future upstream and the past 
downstream— or perhaps you yourself are being carried along by its current.
Imagining time itself— rather than events that occur in time— is not easy. 
To borrow a musical term, time’s nature fulfills a double emploi, as both an ab-
stract concept and a sensed presence of our lives. This duality seems irrecon-
cilable, as attested by centuries of debates involving philosophers, scientists, 
and artists, among others. We come to terms with it by drawing on our bodily 
experience to create useful metaphors, but these metaphors are often incon-
sistent or incoherent (Cox 2017). Consider time as a river: if you are caught 
up in its flow— that is, if you are in time— then the past is upstream. But if 
you survey the river from its bank, the past is downstream. Now, examine 
the metaphor itself. If time is a river, what is it contained in? What constitutes 
the riverbed? And, if you are caught up in its flow, what serves as your point 
of reference such that you know that it does, indeed, flow? Furthermore, if 
you stand as an observer on the riverbank, where are you? Are you outside of 
time? Is that even possible?
Still, even when faced with inconsistency and incoherence, we try to 
imagine time in its multiplicity of forms, expressing its function— more 
so, perhaps, than its nature— as an immaterial force that helps us to order 
and organize the incessant change we encounter in the world. Time gives 
change both a dimensionality (the past, the present, and the future) and a 
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2 Enacting Musical Time
direction (the present— containing elements from the past— opens up onto 
the future). The line is a ubiquitous companion in our imaginings because, 
as David Rosenberg (2010) shows in his beautifully illustrated history of 
the timeline, its flexibility offers a broad assortment of configurations, in-
cluding arrows, loops, spirals, sinusoids, and other shapes able to satisfy the 
needs of those who, for whatever reason, find themselves trying to imagine 
time. Although a relatively recent construct in Western history, the timeline 
holds much sway in our contemporary thinking, along with other temporal 
representations, such as clocks, calendars, tables, and circles. Taken together, 
they form a repository of Western temporal knowledge and a resource for 
our current and future models.
Delving into the history of this knowledge would already take us too far 
afield, even if we limited ourselves to Western thought, and even if we fur-
ther excluded painters, writers, composers, and all other sorts of artists and 
artisans— to say nothing of physicists, economists, engineers, theologians, 
and so on— whose work explicitly considers time and our experience of it.1 
What is clear is that time is one of the foremost concerns for human beings, 
even if thinking about it leads to disagreements about the most basic is-
sues: Does time flow, or is that merely an artifact of our minds? If it does flow, 
does it do so in only one direction, or in several at once? Is time real, or an 
illusion? Is it autonomous and objective, or contingent and subjective? Do we 
move through time, or does time move while we remain stationary? Can we 
travel through time?
For all the disagreement, understanding the nature of time is especially 
urgent for anyone interested in the analysis and interpretation of music, 
which is often— and often without resistance— said to be an eminently tem-
poral artform. And the urgency is only amplified when we consider the most 
recent Western classical art music. Throughout the twentieth century and 
into the twenty- first, time has become one of the most dominant concerns 
for modernist and postmodernist composers, prompted by such a diverse 
range of influences as new digital technologies, developments in the physical 
and natural sciences, cultural theories that focus on the human subject as 
an agent constituting his or her own existence, and non- Western ideas and 
 1 The exercise, in any case, is redundant, because there already exists a substantial body of literature 
that addresses this history in detail. Some of it offers a sweeping view of the most influential thinkers 
on the subject of time, from Plato and Aristotle, through Augustine, Newton, and Einstein, and on 
to Husserl and Hawking (Bardon 2013; Holford- Strevens 2005). Others focus on a specific figure 
(Coope 2005; Canales 2015), historical period (Thomas 2018; McGinnis 2013), or school of thought 
(Hoy 2009; Muldoon 2006).
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Introduction 3
concepts that have filtered into European and North American intellectual 
landscapes (Crispin 2009; Campbell 2013; Lochhead 2002). Some composers 
have written extensively about their approaches to time, leaving us with ex-
plicit ideas that often serve as springboards for analyses of their music. These 
composers include, among others, Igor Stravinsky (1947) and Karlheinz 
Stockhausen (1958, 1959), both of whom distinguished between the objec-
tive time of music and the subjective experience of the listener; Elliott Carter 
(1977), who conceived of time as a screen onto which our lives are projected; 
Pierre Boulez (1971), who drew on the music of Bali and India to conceptu-
alize smooth and striated time; and Gérard Grisey (1987), for whom musical 
time was constituted by three layers— the bones, flesh, and the skin of time.2
As composers continue to use the sonic medium to question established 
orthodoxies and to create new paths through time, it seems that lines no 
longer provide enough multiformity to account for the rich experiential do-
main of the listener. Perhaps it is fortunate, then, that time as such has no 
perceivable appearance apart from the events that “take time,” because it 
grants our imagination the freedom to consider other forms that might aid 
us in processing the unfolding of events around us.
Imagine time differently, then— as a sphere, or a cube, or even a 
hexacosichoron. Imagine it running diagonally, or folding back upon itself, 
or sideways, or from the inside out. Imagine time crackling, wheezing, rus-
tling, swooshing, buzzing. Imagine time as silent. Now imagine it smelling 
of freshly cut grass, or a musty hotel lobby. Then again, what if time glistened 
and shimmered? What if it breathed, slowly, in- out- in- out- in- out? What if it 
came near you, so close that you could feel its warmth, embrace it, hold it in 
your hands? What if it did all of that at once?
These might seem like whimsical metaphors, evocative poetic images that 
do little to augment our understanding of time itself. But in what follows 
I argue that these are all expressions of the same temporalizing act of the 
body engaged with its environment. Rather than replacing old metaphors 
with new ones, each chapter in this book questions notions of time enshrined 
in our theoretical concepts, and, by delving into the pre- discursive space in 
which the listening experience touches the sonic world, offers in their place 
new ways of thinking of time’s significance in our encounters with music. 
What interests me in particular is how and why time shows up as an aspect of 
 2 For extensive commentary on the genesis of Carter’s thought, see Bernard (1995). Campbell 
(2013) discusses these and other composers’ approaches to time from a Deleuzian perspective.
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4 Enacting Musical Time
our listening experience, and how music draws on this experience to create 
opportunities for the emergence of new meanings.
The possibility of time smelling, or shimmering, or drawing nearer to us 
seems to run counter to the prevailing view, which is that odor, luminosity, 
and movement are some of the myriad properties of physical objects. While 
these physical objects undergo a change in time, time itself remains a sepa-
rate (odorless, invisible, immobile) dimension. As Lewis Rowell pointed out 
in his 1996 review of music articles that had been published under the aus-
pices of the International Society for the Study of Time (by now in need of 
updating, but by no means outdated), music- theoretical writings also adhere 
to the prevailing view. According to Rowell (1996b), time is usually regarded 
as “a quantitative dimension articulated by audible events,” with focus pri-
marily directed toward such aspects as rhythm and meter (69). Like the line 
metaphor above, this approach draws on spatial analogues of time as the 
basis for measuring how musical events unfold. The main objective is to un-
derstand the relationships between sounds as if the piece of music were a 
temporally extended object that, although not available for perception be-
yond the sliver of the present, nevertheless “exists” spread out in its entirety 
along the timeline. It makes no difference whether the line runs horizontally 
or vertically, left- to- right or back- to- front, as long as it represents a time fun-
damentally characterized by quantity. This quantity can be expressed as the 
time- interval between successive events (inter- onset interval, or IOI), or as 
proportional relationships between durations, or as locations within a con-
tainer (e.g., a measure) that keeps repeating at a consistent rate.3
By contrast, in this book I focus on a concept of musical time similar to 
what Rowell describes as “ideas and experiences, with distinct properties 
that can be modeled with sound” (Rowell 1996b, 69). My approach is based 
largely on twentieth- century continental philosophy, especially the work 
of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau- Ponty, who suggested 
that time, while real, exists neither objectively nor autonomously. Taking 
up this perspective, I consider time as the form of the listener’s interaction 
with music. Building on evidence from such diverse fields as music theory, 
phenomenology, cognitive science, and social anthropology, I  develop a 
philosophical and critical argument that musical time is constituted by the 
 3 There are numerous examples of these approaches in music- theoretical literature. Some of the 
most influential ones include London (2012), Cohn (1992), and Schachter (1999; see especially 
“Rhythm and Linear Analysis” and “Aspects of Meter”). Most recently, Yust (2018) emphasizes the 
spatial representation of time by explicitly connecting musical temporality with a landscape.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, Fri Aug 30 2019, NEWGEN
/17_revised_proof/revises_i/files_to_typesetting/validation9780190080204_Book.indb   4 30-Aug-19   16:25:40
Introduction 5
moving bodies of participants engaged in musical activities. I put forward 
and illustrate a claim that musical time describes the form of a specific kind 
of interaction between musical sounds and a situated, embodied listener. My 
main thesis is that this musical time emerges when the listener enacts his or 
her implicit kinesthetic knowledge about “how music goes.” Such knowledge 
is expressed in the entire spectrum of behavior, from deliberate inactivity, 
through the simple action of tapping one’s foot in synchrony with the beat, to 
dancing in a way that engages the whole body. I explore this idea in the con-
text of recent Western classical art music, where composers create temporal 
experiences that might feel unfamiliar or idiosyncratic, experiences that blur 
the line between spectatorship and participation, and even experiences that 
challenge conventional notions of musical form.
To be sure, the way in which I regard time is novel in the field of music 
theory, and its emergence from skillful behavior in response to the auditory 
signal requires some explaining. By way of a non- musical example, consider 
your first encounter with a bottle of perfume that is new to you. As you press 
on the plunger, aerosolized droplets rush out and form a cloud that hangs in 
the air in front of you. In order to catch a whiff, you move your head, maybe 
even your whole body, this way and that. You create a fan- like motion with 
your hands in order to direct the fragrant air toward your nose. Move too 
much to the side, and the smell disappears; linger too close to the center of 
the cloud, and it becomes overwhelming, suffocating. There is a reciprocity 
in this action between bodily movements and the olfactory sensation, each 
one guiding and responding to the other. The structure of the event emerges 
from the interaction.
Skeptics will argue that it is possible to construe this interaction as some-
thing unfolding in time, with reference to an external, independent time-
keeper. We might talk, for example, about the velocity with which droplets 
disperse through the air, or the speed with which electrical impulses travel 
from the olfactory bulb to the amygdala in the brain. These are all valid ways 
of describing the situation, but they separate the mechanics of the interac-
tion from its significance, which is to discover the odorous properties of the 
perfume. Important to this discovery is the way the reciprocal relationship 
between the aerosolized droplets and the human subject gives both spatial 
and temporal structure to this encounter. This structure is not given prior 
to the event’s unfolding, but instead emerges during the bodily engagement 
with entities in the environment. Thus, in the above scenario, the ordering 
of the event— the precise manner in which it unfolds— is driven by the 
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6 Enacting Musical Time
unique dynamics between the chemical compounds that make up the per-
fume droplets and the situated, embodied subject who experiences them as 
a particular kind of smell, with a particular concentration and a particular 
quality. These unique dynamics imbue the entire interaction with a special 
significance, and it is this significance that constitutes time. As Merleau- 
Ponty (1968) argued, time is precisely the form of the unique dynamics be-
tween entities in the world; it is a relation— or what he called “a network of 
intentionalities”— distributed among all humans as well as the things and 
creatures around them.
Central to the distributed network of intentionalities is a body actively en-
gaged with the world. This world includes various auditory signals, some of 
which form patterns that enculturated listeners recognize as music. Work on 
the relationship between listeners’ bodily movements and common- practice 
musical techniques, such as the metrical organization of tonal harmonic 
patterns, is already well into its heyday, both in terms of gathering empir-
ical evidence, and the development of theoretical models.4 Research in this 
regard is thriving, spurred by the ever- advancing technological innovations 
in the field of human motion- capture and analysis. By contrast, the picture 
of the body’s function in contemporary music is still coming into focus. 
Scholars like Arnie Cox (2017), Lawrence Zbikowski (2016), Andrew Mead 
(1999), and Judy Lochhead (2015) have been making considerable inroads, 
but I would not be surprised if, apart from the context of “modern dance,” 
many readers found it inconceivable that one’s body could be explicitly in-
volved while listening to new music. I say this having run numerous studies 
in which I asked participants to do just that: to move in response to pieces 
that hardly used any recognizable “musical” materials, to say nothing of such 
familiar constructs as meter or even a beat. For some, the task was incom-
prehensible, even offensive. But for the vast majority it turned out to be an 
exhilarating, eye- (and ear!)- opening encounter, which ultimately convinced 
them that new music need not be “difficult,” that it need not be an intensely 
cerebral experience marked by immobile concentration and requiring an al-
most mathematical understanding of how the sounds relate to one another. 
In other words, that new music could move them.
 4 Several collections of essays have appeared in the last decade that address theoretical and empir-
ical aspects of musical embodiment, including Godøy and Leman (2010), Gritten and King (2006, 
2011), and Leman et al. (2017).
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Introduction 7
This book is partly an elaboration of these encounters and their applica-
tion to questions of musical time and meaning. One of my goals is to open 
up productive avenues for interpreting contemporary works that bring to 
listeners’ attention various problems associated with the experience of time. 
To that end, the central focus is on the listeners’ bodies, their capabilities, and 
the emergence of a particular kind of meaning— which I call significance— in 
contemporary music.5 Significance is a pragmatic meaning that is immanent 
in the interaction between music and listener. Basing my discussion on the 
above- mentioned embodied phenomenology of Merleau- Ponty, and on the 
ecological psychology of J. J. Gibson, I show that the body enacts time by actu-
alizing the potential inherent in a given situation. Motivating this body is the 
basic interest in, and engagement with, the sonic environment. As such, this 
is not a book that merely connects time with music, but one that reexamines 
the tools of music analysis through the lens of what phenomenologists call 
“lived time,” or time as it shows up in human lives (Hoy 2009). My intent is to 
challenge conventional ways of thinking about musical time and its related 
concepts of rhythm, meter, tempo, and form, with the hope that this chal-
lenge expands of our conception of musical time in a way that harmonizes 
with the rich depth of our experiences.
Music and Time
Following Susanne Langer, and especially later extensions of her ideas in 
Zbikowski’s Foundations of Musical Grammar (2017), I endorse the notion 
that music’s significance lies in the way it uses successions of sounds to reflect 
the temporal bodily patterns that a given culture finds important enough to 
store for later retrieval. One consequence of this function of music is that 
our bodies produce a kind of knowledge that lies close to the way in which 
time is constituted. In turn, those same bodies influence how we understand 
musical meaning. This way of thinking about musical time engages with is-
sues of musical functions in various human cultures. As such, it differs from 
how time is usually considered in music theory, where it typically shows up 
 5 There is a lot more focus on the performers’ bodies in relation to musical meaning. The list is 
long, but some of the most influential contributions include Sudnow (1978), Cusick (1994), Mead 
(1999), Fisher and Lochhead (2002), and Montague (2012). Most recently De Souza (2017) devotes 
a chapter to listeners, even though the bulk of his book addresses performers. Moreover, Cox (2017) 
attempts to bridge the split between the body’s role in performance and in listening.
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8 Enacting Musical Time
in concrete terms as part of analyses of rhythm and meter.6 Although such 
studies ostensibly deal with time, few challenge its ontological status, treating 
it as a foregone conclusion.7 One could hardly assail, for example, the confi-
dence in Robert Morgan’s assertion that “there is no question, of course, that 
music is a temporal art” (1980, 527; emphasis added). But what if the author’s 
claim were not as indubitable as it seems? What if music’s relationship to time 
were a question? In what way is music a temporal art?
In the writings of the theorists who have grappled with issues of ontology, 
there is a proliferation of different kinds of time, each one signaling a concern 
with different aspects of musical unfolding. To list a few examples, Jonathan 
Kramer (1988) draws a distinction between “linear” and “non- linear” time, 
both of which describe different logical relationships between sonic events; 
Barbara Barry (1990) theorizes “structured” and “transcendent” time, the 
former referring to motion and the latter to space; David Epstein (1995) 
posits “chronometric” and “integral” time, which he identifies with meter 
and rhythm, respectively; Byron Almén and Robert Hatten distinguish be-
tween “suspended,” “cyclical,” “symmetrical or mirrored,” and other kinds of 
time, all having to do with aspects of narrative in twentieth- century music.8 
In contrast to these, Christopher Hasty’s Meter as Rhythm (1997) erases all 
dichotomies and presents an argument that musical meter is a form of mu-
sical rhythm.9 Asking us to “take time seriously,” his Whitehead- inspired 
 6 Rhythm concerns information contained in the acoustical signal itself: it is the distribution of 
auditory pressure waves. Meter, by contrast, is the way in which rhythm is organized into regularly 
recurring, hierarchically organized groups (London 2001). There is some disagreement regarding 
whether meter is an objective musical property (Poudier 2008), or whether it is the listeners’ cogni-
tive ability (Keller and Burnham 2005), or whether it depends equally on both (London 2012), but 
general consensus is that there is a categorical difference between things happening at the musical 
“surface” and their “deeper” organization (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983).
 7 Some recent examples of studies of rhythm and meter in music theory include Yeston (1974), 
Lester (1986), Mirka (2009), Malin (2010), Murphy (2009), and Smith (2006). Both have also been 
studied extensively from a cognitive perspective: see in particular Longuet- Higgins and Lee (1982), 
Riess Jones (1987), Clarke and Krumhansl (1990), Gjerdingen (1989), and Grahn and Brett (2007). 
For a thorough review of this literature, see DeGraf (2018).
 8 Two more monographs are worth mentioning in this context: Arnie Cox’s Music and Embodied 
Cognition (2017) (which, although not concerned with time per se, does address the bodily source of 
our metaphors of time, as well as how our bodies participate in the construction of musical meaning), 
and Justin London’s Hearing in Time (2012) (which does not explicitly tackle the ontology of time it-
self, but does incorporate spatial concepts of time into a theory of meter).
 9 Krebs (1999) also eschews dichotomies in his theory of meter. To him, meter is “the union of all 
layers of motion (i.e., series of regularly recurring pulses)” active within a piece of music. He iden-
tifies three such layers: the pulse layer, which is “the most quickly moving pervasive series of pulses, 
generally arising from more or less constant series of attacks on the musical surface”; even more 
quickly moving are “micropulses,” which are “coloristic embellishments” of meter; and the “interpre-
tive” layer, which is the slowest moving series of regular pulses that is perceptible, and which “allow 
the listener to ‘interpret’ the raw data of the pulse layer by organizing its pulses into larger units” (23).
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Introduction 9
philosophical approach gives us good reason to think that the distinction 
between meter and rhythm is merely a matter of nomenclature. Instead of 
thinking of them as opposing kinds of time, Hasty suggests that meter, like 
rhythm, results from a listener’s active engagement in making sense of the 
object of experience— in this case, music. An interesting fallout of this shift 
in perspective is that even music without an explicit metrical structure can 
be heard as a succession of upbeats and downbeats, which he illustrates with 
analyses of such twentieth- century works as Anton Webern’s Quartet Op. 22 
(1930) and Pierre Boulez’s Le Marteau sans maître (1954).
Hasty’s assertion that process is a fundamental feature of musical 
time, his ultimate focus on music outside of the common- practice tra-
dition, and especially his entreaty to “take time seriously,” all resonate 
across the pages of this volume. However, there is an author— likely little 
known to music theorists— who has influenced my own thinking to an 
even greater extent. David Burrows’s Time and the Warm Body (2007) 
presents an entirely original philosophy of time based on a binary oppo-
sition between two impulses that permeate the universe: going and stabi-
lizing. According to Burrows, the oscillation between these two states is 
a necessary condition of the survival of any dynamical system, whether 
at subatomic or supra- galactic levels. Music in this schema is “our most 
dedicated and fine- grained isolation and cultivation of time and its issues 
in an art form” (65). With its focus on the generative now, music uses the 
flow of sounding events to serve as a representation of the most essential 
features of time, which are the driving impulses of movement and sta-
bility. As a microcosm of life- sustaining processes, music for Burrows is a 
model of temporality.
Hasty and Burrows form the backdrop for the discussion that ensues in the 
following chapters. The former makes a case that our theoretical reflections 
on the temporal dimension of music should more closely harmonize with 
our listening experience. The latter argues that the “now” is central to the 
constitution of our time, and that music— which, if it could be said to exist, 
only does so in the “now”— is really efficient at revealing the most significant 
attributes of time. My own contribution integrates these two perspectives by 
considering the position of an embodied, situated, flesh- and- blood listener 
who enacts the temporal patterns of music. What are the temporalities evi-
dent in our interactions with musical sounds? What bodily skills and capac-
ities make these interactions possible? And, most importantly, what are the 
implications of these interactions for musical understanding?
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10 Enacting Musical Time
Enacting Musical Time
By engaging with these questions, my aim is to explore a level of musical 
understanding that I  consider to be fundamental to the listening experi-
ence. In the process, I expose some of the assumptions that underlie music- 
theoretical endeavors and reassess certain concepts that have long become 
ossified in our analytical methods. I do this in an effort to use the physicality 
of a situated listener as a lens through which the connection between music 
and time can be imagined anew. To that end, the book’s overarching argu-
ment begins with the problem of meaning. I propose that an active, bodily 
engagement with musical sounds offers a window into a pre- linguistic, non- 
representational significance, which discloses music as a temporal object by 
retaining the dynamical nature of time. Significance is captured by Gibson’s 
theory of affordances, but since music— in addition to being part of the sonic 
environment— has aesthetic value, we need to amend the theory to include 
temporal objects that offer the listener what I call “temporal affordances.” 
These affordances specify when an action needs to take place, and they 
emerge in listeners’ embodied interactions with musical sounds. Such mu-
sical interactions, which constitute each listener’s enacted knowledge of 
musical processes, are socially and culturally conditioned from birth, begin-
ning with the earliest communion between an infant and a caregiver, and 
are driven by another set of constraints in the form of “social affordances” 
available to each well- adapted listener. By observing musical interactions, we 
gain insight into the emergence of a level of musical understanding that is 
inextricably bound up with the passage of time, and in which such passage is 
manifested. Based on this understanding, my approach implicates both the 
listening body and the musical temporal object as the co- creators of time.
The time that is thus created is not the objective, spatial time that was so 
famously and publicly denounced by Henri Bergson.10 Rather, it is lived 
time— time characterized by a quality that both shapes and is shaped by the 
dynamics of our interactions with the environment. Merleau- Ponty (2012) 
argued that it is a time of a single experience of a continually changing pre-
sent, in which what was once implicit becomes explicit, while what was 
 10 Bergson makes no explicit appearance in my discussion, but his ideas resonate throughout 
the writings of most philosophers of time in the twentieth century. On the famous debate between 
Bergson and Einstein concerning the nature of time, see Canales (2015). Bergson’s most significant 
critiques of spatial, “scientific” time can be found in his Matière et mémoire (1896) and Essai sur les 
donneés immédiates de la conscience (1889).
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Introduction 11
explicit becomes implicit. I add to this that lived time is enacted. Enaction 
concerns the view that our minds are not bound by the skull, with the brain 
forming representations of the external world based on information that is 
passed on by the perceptual system, but rather that it originates in and is con-
stituted by perceptually guided action (Schiavio et al. 2017). In other words, 
it is an activity described by the interactions between an organism and its 
environment. Meaning is something that the organism brings forth within 
a system that encompasses its neurology, physiology, and the environment 
in which it is embedded. In particular, enactivism— the intellectual tradi-
tion that draws on enaction— focuses on subjective experience in order to 
consider the role of emotion, affect, and motivation in constituting human 
cognition (Thompson 2008). According to this view, perception is not a pas-
sive effect of an external stimulus, but rather a mutual interaction emerging 
from skillful bodily activity: as the world solicits certain actions by virtue 
of the organism’s openness to its own milieu, the organism reconfigures the 
environment by virtue of those solicited actions. The key here is the fact that 
the organism is motivated to act on the world, to care about its own survival 
such that the world shows up as a “correlate of [its] needs and concerns” 
(Colombetti 2013, 2).
Time in this context is the structure, or meaning, or the significance of the 
interaction. It emerges from the affordance- driven dynamical system that 
forms between skillfully acting, affectively motivated agents and an environ-
ment to which they are well adapted. We can summarize the main points of 
time- as- enaction using the following principles:
 - Time is an emergent property of one’s active, dynamic, affectively 
charged engagement with the environment; it is the form that emerges 
from this engagement.
 - Time is a kind of performance in the sense of having a dual character of 
being culturally sanctioned but also open to individual variation based 
on the agent’s affective disposition.
 - Time is actively generated by a living, animate being. An autono-
mous organism creates its own conditions of existence in a process of 
“auto- affection.”
 - Enacted time emerges from the exercise of skillful know- how in situ-
ated, bodily action. The environment and the skilled agent together 
create a dynamical system.
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 - Enacted time exists as the relation between the cognitive agent and the 
environment. It is not the sole property of either one, and it alters as the 
relationship changes.
 - Enacted time is not perceived; rather, it is experienced. The body of the 
agent is central to its emergence.
I elaborate these principles by weaving them into the narrative arc of the 
book, which progresses from the surface of time to its depth, with each 
chapter serving as a step along this descent. The upshot is that moments in 
time are characterized by two seemingly mutually exclusive features. On the 
one hand, they each have a depth that interconnects them through our sense 
of the past and of the future. Importantly, this interconnection does not di-
rectly implicate memory and anticipation, because those already presuppose 
a sense of past and future: memory and anticipation are present experiences, 
whereas a sense of the past and future is a sense of something precisely not 
present. On the other hand, each moment has a distinct feel, or grain, which 
makes it unique and wholly different from all other moments. There is an af-
fective dichotomy insofar as any given present is at once familiar (because it 
is something of our creation, where it integrates with other moments of our 
being) and also strange and foreign (because it happens only that one time, 
and it can never be recovered). Time is therefore both coherent and inco-
herent, and we use the concept of time as a tool to both create familiarity and 
to provide support for the unfamiliar.
In what follows I  engage in analyses of examples from contemporary 
Western art music in which composers, by foregrounding time as a point 
of concern, offer opportunities to experience the tension between what is 
familiar and what is not. This effect can be achieved through a number of 
techniques, including stretching the interval between sonic events beyond 
the limits of listeners’ working memories, eschewing regularities of pulse 
and metrical organization, creating musical forms that challenge notions of 
a linear and uniformly moving time, or using sounds that more readily re-
semble noise. In all of these situations, as well as others in which something 
out of the ordinary is happening in the music, time acquires the potential to 
surge out of its neutral state as the background of our lives and become an ob-
ject of listeners’ attention. A fluctuation, a slippage, a momentary wobble or 
vibration in temporality knocks it out of balance and perturbs it just enough 
for the listener to take notice. I draw on the resources provided by the lis-
tening body to identify and analyze these perturbations, in turn illustrating 
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how composers aesthetically extend the temporality of everyday life and im-
pugn our common- sense notions of time.
Chapter 1, “Meaning,” develops two claims that are central to the book’s 
overall argument. The first is that certain temporal musical objects exist only 
as ephemera— always remaining outside of symbolic representation. These 
objects are constituted by lived time. The second claim is that the ephemeral 
meaning of music consists of its significance, which I define as a practical 
meaning that arises in the moment of one’s perception of, and action upon, 
one’s immediate environment. Significance is a process that is enacted in the 
dyadic relationships between environmental affordances— opportunities for 
and constraints of action— and a situated agent.
In Chapter  2, “Affordances,” I  elaborate on the idea that significance is 
manifested in music’s affordances relative to listeners’ bodily capabilities. 
I argue that music is a significant phenomenon because it furnishes listeners 
with two kinds of affordances:  “social affordances,” and what I  call “tem-
poral affordances.” These latter affordances specify when an action can be 
performed, and thus differ from their spatial counterparts, which specify 
the kinds of actions one can perform. Social and temporal affordances can 
interact, but current theories of musical affordances are incomplete insofar 
as they treat music as an environmental sound while deferring its aesthetic 
value to “higher” cognitive processes. In contrast to these theories, I argue 
that the process of aestheticization begins precisely when music temporalizes 
the world for its listeners— that is, when time becomes a point of concern.
Affordance systems are constituted by two elements: the physical world, 
and the bodies of perceiving organisms. Whereas in Chapter 2 I focused on 
the former, in Chapter 3 (“Body”) I take a closer look at listeners’ bodily capa-
bilities. I first draw on my own and others’ observational studies to show how 
listeners’ capacities for movement to music unfold in two distinct ways: (1) 
by synchronizing with a pulse, and (2)  by coordinating their movements 
with events separated by longer, or uneven, spans of time. I then argue that 
these two categories of movement constitute a kinesthetic knowledge of 
music’s temporal processes— of “how music goes.” I develop a comprehen-
sive account of this knowledge as a contextual enactment, through bodily en-
gagement with the world, of the dynamics, affectivity, and intercorporeality 
of our involvement with the world— as a dynamic feel of living as an animate 
and environmentally embedded being engaged in some task.
Chapter 4, “Flesh,” connects the notion of affordances with phenomeno-
logical investigation to explore how the human body, with its perceptual and 
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animate capabilities, co- creates time together with the sonic environment. 
I employ Merleau- Ponty’s concept of flesh as an inextricable link between 
a subjective body and the objective world, and consider how time may be 
viewed as one of the forms that this link can take. Highlighting the similar-
ities between affordances and flesh— arguing that the former describe the 
interaction between bodily and environmental capacities, while the latter 
discloses the structure of the system as a whole— I return to my earlier pro-
posal that music, as a social and temporal affordance, allows us to consider 
the listener- music interaction as the very source of time. Time here is enacted 
when, engaged in this interaction, the body slips back- and- forth between its 
appearance as a physical object submerged in the world and its function as 
the seat of subjectivity.
Chapters 5 and 6 are intended to more fully demonstrate the analytic ca-
pacity of the enactive approach developed earlier in the book. In Chapter 5, 
“Affectivity,” I draw once again on Merleau- Ponty, as well as recent additions 
to his work by the neuroscientist Francisco Varela (Verela and Depraz 2005; 
Varela et al. 1992) and the cultural theorist Mark Hansen (2004a, 2004b), 
in order to explore how listeners’ fundamental capacity to both affect and 
be affected by musical sounds generates lived musical time. I illustrate the 
consequences of this process with an analysis of time and eternity in Louis 
Andriessen’s monumental work De Tijd (1979– 81). In contrast to this focus 
on “micro- listening,” or an approach that attends to minute sonic fluctuations, 
in Chapter 6 I  look at the enactment of time over the course of an entire 
piece. This final chapter, titled “Verticality,” presents an analysis of Toshio 
Hosokawa’s Vertical Time Study I (1993) as a vehicle for examining how the 
body participates in creating structure in Western contemporary music.
* * *
My goal in this volume is to open up the music- theoretical dialogue to 
new ways of thinking about the role of the body in constructing musical 
meanings, and to explore the consequences of this thinking as it relates to 
our understanding of the relationship between music and time. That said, 
this is not explicitly a study of rhythm and meter. In fact, most of the mu-
sical examples I analyze forestall a sense of metrical organization, and one in 
particular— Louis Andriessen’s De Tijd (see Chapter 5)— can hardly be said 
to employ rhythm (in the conventional sense) at all. Neither am I interested 
in cataloguing the specific techniques that contemporary composers use to 
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undermine or otherwise highlight various temporal forms. Studies that en-
gage in such analyses typically draw on objective notions of time in order to 
address the emergence of musical meaning as a response to normative tem-
poral experiences. The method usually assumes a stable ontology of time 
that is “encoded”— as Robert Hatten (2006) describes it— in specific kinds 
of musical events, and proceeds by showing how a composer is able to dis-
close or engender alternative temporal experiences by deviating from those 
encodings. Although I  too am concerned with how contemporary music 
offers opportunities for new temporal experiences, I cautiously avoid refer-
ring to objective time as a standard for comparison. Furthermore, this book 
is not meant to present an overview of the myriad ways in which contem-
porary composers themselves think about time and how their concepts are 
implemented in the sounding material. If anything, I tend to push against the 
composers’ own words in order to expose and amplify the gaps and cracks 
between the different philosophical, scientific, and aesthetic traditions that 
comprise their milieu.
Finally, the scope of the discussion is limited to recent Western classical 
art music, and I make no explicit claims about the more general applicability 
of the theoretical or analytical perspective I develop. A more comprehen-
sive project would not only require a synthesis of the vast literature on time 
and embodiment— perhaps in the form of an original ontology of musical 
time— and an expansion of repertoire beyond the classical idiom, it would 
also have to incorporate concepts and musical practices from non- Western 
cultures. From a pragmatic perspective, this would inflate the present book 
beyond all limits of manageability. For the same reason, I do not present em-
pirical data as evidence of human embodied– cognitive capacities, but in-
stead use these data as the ground from which I embark upon an analysis 
of musical practices themselves. Put differently: whereas scientific work on 
musical embodiment focuses on answering questions about how people hear 
and comprehend music, here I  reflect listening capabilities back onto the 
musical object in order to ask: “What does how you hear tell me about what 
you hear?”
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